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COMPETITION AT THE BAR AND THE
PROPOSED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS
STEPHEN K. HUBERt
The genesis of formal rules of professional behavior for lawyers in
this country is Judge George Sharswood's Essay on Professional Ethics,
published in 1854.1 The principles set out therein were closely followed
in a code of professional ethics adopted by the State Bar of Alabama,
which in turn became the basis for the Canons of Professional Ethics
promulgated in 1908 by the American Bar Association. The Canons,
admittedly with some additions and amendments, survived for more
than sixty years until superseded in 1969 by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.' The Canons were thought to have been defective in
four principal particulars:
(1) There are important areas involving the conduct of lawyers that
are either only partially covered in or totally omitted from the
Canons; (2) Many Canons that are sound in substance are in need of
editorial revision; (3) Most of the Canons do not lend themselves to
practical sanctions of violations; and (4) Changed and changing con-
ditions in our legal system and urbanized society~require new state-
ments of professional principles.3
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston. B.A. 1963, Earlham College; J.D.
1966, University of Chicago; LL.M. 1974, Yale University. The author worked for the Office of
Economic Opportunity's Legal Services Program from 1969 to 1972, primarily as Director of the
Program Development and Training Division.
1. G. SHARSWOOD, ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (Philadelphia 1854). The essay was
initially presented as a series of lectures at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. It still
makes good reading according to a former chairman of the ABA Committee on Professional
Ethics:
It is surprising how well Sharswood reads, even today. His division of the lawyer's.du-
ties into those which he owes his client, the public, the state, the court, and his profes-
sional brethren still has validity. The ethical principles he establishes are eternal and
therefore just as pertinent today as they were more than a century ago. It is in their
application to specific cases that the difficulties lie.
Armstrong, A/ Century of Legal Ethics, 64 A.B.A.J. 1063, 1063 (1978).
2. Both the Canons and the Code were adopted in every state, generally with few if any
modifications. Three forms of adoption were utilized: by legislation, by a unified bar, or by order
of the highest state court. The effect in each instance was the creation of rules of positive law for
the violation of which lawyers could be punished.
3. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preface.
The Canons, including amendments, consisted of 47 serially numbered provisions. Sanctions
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Five years were devoted to preparation of the Code.4 Less than a
decade after completion it has proven to be so unworkable that, despite
the adoption of several major amendments, the Code is being scrapped
and will be replaced by a new document, the Code of Professional
Standards.' Why did the Code, a product of years of concerted effort
by many diligent and able people, become outmoded so rapidly? This
question requires careful consideration if the Standards are to have a
longer and more useful existence than their predecessor.
This article will argue that one important reason the Code proved
unserviceable is that it did not permit the delivery of legal services to be
organized in an efficient and cost-minimizing manner. In recent years
the Supreme Court of the United States has decided that a number of
rules in codes of professional behavior served primarily to increase
profits for members of those professions. Among those cases are some
in which the Court has determined that competition in the delivery of
legal services would serve the public better than government-imposed
restraints. Making these determinations required the invalidation of
state laws regulating economic behavior. The legal vehicles for reach-
ing this result were the antitrust laws and the first amendment, rather
than substantive due process, which had been utilized earlier in this
century.
Attention will first be addressed to four "group legal services"
cases, which involved efforts by potential purchasers of legal services to
obtain assistance on behalf of their members, and to several cases de-
cided by the Court since 1975, which have permitted, if not mandated,
substantial competitive activity among professionals, particularly law-
yers. After considering these cases and some contemporaneous devel-
opments in the social organization of the practice of law, the discussion
ranged from a private reprimand to disbarment. The Code contains three types of provisions:
canons, ethical considerations and disciplinary rules. The canons, of which there are nine, state
axiomatic norms. They are too general to merit analysis, and will not receive further mention.
Disciplinary Rules (DR) are mandatory in character, and punitive sanctions can be imposed for
violations. Ethical Considerations (EC) are aspirational in character, adherence to them is recom-
mended but not mandatory.
4. The House of Delegates of the ABA, at the behest of its then President, Lewis Powell,
created a Special Committee on Ethical Standards at its annual meeting in August 1964. The
Committee's work product was adopted in its final form by the House of Delegates in August
1969. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY, Preface. Powell thought that the Canons
"were in need of major revision, particularly with respect to the relationship between the press and
the bar, the representation of unpopular causes, and grievance procedures." Seymour, The First
Century of the American Bar .4ssociation, 64 A.B.A.J. 1038, 1049 (1978).
5. The ABA appointed a Special Committee on Evaluation of Professional Standards in late
1977 to draft a document to replace the Code.
6. See text accompanying notes 10-19 infra.
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will turn to the Code of Professional Responsibility and an examina-
tion of existing Code provisions that regulate the economic behavior of
lawyers. It will be recommended that these provisions should not be
retained in the Standards. Rules that operate only to control economic
aspects of the practice of law have no place in a body of rules for pro-
fessional behavior, especially when they serve no purpose other than to
limit affordable access to lawyers.
The Code and the Canons were designed for an idealized America
that no longer exists. As early as 1934 Harlan Fiske Stone had ob-
served that "[o]ur canons of ethics are for the most part generalizations
designed for an earlier era."7 This statement is quoted in the preface to
the Code, but is not reflected in its substantive provisions, which barely
address the problem of getting attorneys and clients together at reason-
able prices in a largely urban land. Karl Llewellyn described the prob-
lem in the following manner:
The canons of ethics on business-getting are still built in terms of a
town of twenty-five thousand (or, much more dubiously, even fifty
thousand) .... All the lawyers are known, and people who have
legal work to do are moderately aware of it; and they have little diffi-
culty in finding a lawyer of whose character, abilities, experience,
yes, and fees, they can get some fair inkling ahead of time .... Turn
these same canons loose on a great city, and the results are devastat-
ing in proportion to its size .... [T]he conditions of metropolitan
legal business make it no simple thing to reach into the grab-bag and
pull out a lawyer who is able, experienced in the case at hand, not too
taken up with other matters, and also reasonable in fee. 8
Rather than heeding these admonitions, the bar insisted that the Code
follow the Canons in containing detailed provisions designed expressly
to ensure that lawyers could not make their availability to and desire
for clients known to the public. In addition to restrictions on competi-
tion among attorneys, participation by lay intermediaries in supplying
legal services was prohibited. Bar associations exercised vigilance in
protecting their turf from encroachment by outsiders. The definition of
legal work was stated broadly to increase the scope of what constituted
the unauthorized practice of law.
7. Stone, The Public Influence ofthe Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1934).
8. Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles, and Poultices-And Cures?, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
104, 115-16 (1938).
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I. THE MOVEMENT FROM PROTECTION TO COMPETITION
During the course of this century many job categories have be-
come subject to occupational licensure. Although such licensing is al-
ways undertaken in the public interest, licensure requirements are
almost universally imposed at the behest of the group to be regulated
and not the public.9 Licensed groups adopt codes of ethics that restrict
competition among insiders and prevent encroachment on the group's
domain by outsiders. Although many licensed groups have adopted
restrictive rules similar to those contained in the Canons and the Code,
the Supreme Court has been particularly willing to invalidate rules of
ethics for lawyers, perhaps because the justices are able to recognize
more clearly in their own profession than in others that rules restricting
competition serve largely the interests of the profession and only inci-
dentally those of the public. Also, the legal profession has been more
successful than other groups in its efforts to restrict competition, both
among its members and by outsiders.
A. Changes in Judicial Attitude
Until early in this century courts severely circumscribed the scope
of legislative attempts at economic regulation through the doctrine of
substantive due process. The position that the Constitution gives pref-
erence to no particular economic principles did not gain complete as-
cendancy until the early 1930's, when the Supreme Court ruled that:
[A] state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably
be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by
legislation adapted to its purpose. . . . "Whether the free operation
of the normal laws of competition is a wise and wholesome rule for
trade and commerce is an economic question which the court need
not consider or determine." . . . With the wisdom of the policy
adopted . the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to
deal. 1o
One consequence of the demise of substantive due process was
that courts refused to evaluate anticompetitive rules of professional
groups that succeeded in obtaining legislative approval. Justice
Holmes' famous dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New York" was often
9. See generally M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 137-60 (1962); B. SHIMBERG, B.
ESSER & D. KRUGER, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: PRACTICES AND POLICIES (1972).
10. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) (quoting Northern Sec. Co. v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197, 337 (1904)).
I1. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The Lochner case represented "the focal point in a judicial move to
fasten on the country by constitutional exegesis unsanctioned by the Constitution a pattern of
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quoted in upholding such provisions:
It is settled by various decisions of this court that state constitutions
and state laws may regulate life in many ways which we as legislators
might think of as injudicious or if you like as tyrannical .... The
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics. . . . [A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular
economic theory, whether of paternalism. . . or of iaissezfaire.12
Once this attitude was accepted, it is not surprising that the
Supreme Court turned away a dentist's challenge to a state law that
precluded him from engaging in truthful advertising.' 3 When the ex-
tensive regulations that Oklahoma imposed on the preparation and sale
of eyeglasses were challenged, the Supreme Court upheld the legisla-
tion and accepted as a valid objective the state's attempt to remove
from the eyeglass business "all taints of commercialism."' 4 If this pol-
icy was thought to be unwise and costly to consumers, the proper forum
before which to raise the argument was the legislature. 5 A challenge
to a Kansas statute that permitted only lawyers to engage in the busi-
ness of debt adjusting was turned away for the same reason.
Whether the legislature takes for its textbook Adam Smith, Herbert
Spencer, Lord Keynes, or some other is no concern of ours. The
Kansas debt adjusting statute may be wise or unwise. But relief, if
any be needed, lies not with us but the body constituted to pass laws
for the State of Kansas.' 6
In this legal climate the prevention of competition both among
those in the profession and from outsiders becomes a major if unarticu-
lated, objective of bar associations. Since the raison d'etre for profes-
sional licensing and rules of ethics is protection of the public, the desire
economic organization believed by the Court to be essential to the fullest development of the
nation's economy." Strong, The Economic Philosophy of Lochner: Emergence, Embrasure and
Emasculation, 15 ARIZ. L. REv. 419, 419 (1973).
12. 198 U.S. at 75 (dissenting opinion).
13. Semler v. Oregon State Bd. ofDental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935). "[Tihe community
is concerned in providing safeguards not only against deception, but against practices which
would tend to demoralize the profession by forcing its members into an unseemly rivalry which
would enlarge the opportunities of the least scrupulous." Id. at 612.
14. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (emphasis added).
15. The Court noted:
The Oklahoma law may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases. But it is
for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the
new requirement ...
The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because
they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.
d. at 487-88.
16. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963) (footnotes omitted), quoted with approvalin
North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156, 165-66 (1973).
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to limit competition was rarely admitted. An exception is illuminating.
The Jacksonville, Florida, bar established a lawyer referral service in
which all local attorneys were eligible to participate and then pro-
ceeded to advertise its existence. A challenge to this scheme, based on
Canon 28, which condemned advertising, was rejected because the ad-
vertisement did not involve competition among members of the profes-
sion and so did not fit within the reason for the rule.17 The Florida
Supreme Court noted: "Of course competition is at the root of abuses
in advertising. . . . But the advertising before us represents the very
antithesis of competition." 8 When individual lawyers advertised, they
competed with one another, but when the referral service was publi-
cized, it created business for the whole profession, and so did not vio-
late the Canons.
The legal bases for recent decisions mandating competition in the
professions have been the antitrust laws and the first amendment, but
the results have been the same as might have been achieved in earlier
years through the substantive due process standard. 9 The important
question raised by these developments of the extent to which the judi-
cial branch of government should defer to a legislative determination
of the public interest will not be considered here.20 The discussion that
follows will focus on the impact of recent Supreme Court decisions on
the organization of the practice of law. The doctrinal underpinnings
17. Jacksonville Bar Ass'n v. Wilson, 102 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1958).
18. Id. at 295.
19. The use of the antitrust laws to invalidate state regulation of economic activity has been
sharply criticized.
Although presumably disdainful of substantive due process, the federal courts have
seized upon another approach to oversee state economic regulation. Increasingly the
challenge to occupational licensing and price fixing by state regulatory bodies has come
in the form of application of the antitrust laws to the offensive conduct. . . . [Tihose
who oppose substantive economic review of state activity under the due process clause
should doubt the advisability of engaging in antitrust review of that same activity, and
for precisely the same reasons.
Verkuil, S/ale Ac/ion, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L.
Rrv. 328, 329-30 (1975).
20. Justice Rehnquist has argued, after the fashion of Justice Harlan before him, that the
courts should defer to legislative judgments in the regulation of professions:
The Court speaks of the consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information
.... It goes on to observe that "society also may have a strong interest in the free flow
of commercial information." One need not disagree with either of these statements in
order to feel that they should presumptively be the concern of the Virginia Legislature,
which sits to balance these and other claims . . . . [T]here is certainly nothing in the
United States Constitution which requires the Virginia Legislature to hew to the teach-
ings of Adam Smith in its legislative decisions. ...
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 783-84
(1976) (dissenting opinion).
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offered by the Court in support of its decisions will receive only cursory
analysis.
B. The Group Legal Services Cases
The Canons prohibited a lawyer from providing legal services to
members of a group, though not to the group itself."1 The group was a
"lay intermediary," and the evil involved was that the group came be-
tween the attorney and the client. This rule prohibited an automobile
club from providing a lawyer for its members in traffic cases,2" a civil
rights group from furnishing legal assistance in school desegregation
cases, 23 and it even prevented a union from advising its members about
what lawyer to retain in seeking compensation for job related inju-
ries." The wrong done by the lawyer depended on the manner in
which he received payment. If the group reimbursed the lawyer for
work done on behalf of its members, then the group was engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law, and it was wrongful for the lawyer to
assist the group in this illegal undertaking. 25 If the group acted only as
a facilitator in bringing its members and the attorney together, with
payment made by the client directly to the lawyer, then the evil in-
volved was solicitation.
Until recently, groups have demonstrated little interest in provid-
ing legal services for their members on even a limited basis. A major
reason is that early attempts to do so were vigorously and successfully
opposed by bar associations. During the 1930's, a few automobile
21. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 35 provided:
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any lay agency,
personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer....
A lawyer may accept employment from any organization. . . to render legal services in any
matter in which organization the organization, as an entity, is interested, but this employment
should not include the rendering of legal services to the members of such an organization in
respect to their individual affairs.
Charitable legal aid societies were exempted from these provisions, presumably because organiza-
tions that served only the indigent did not compete with private practitioners for clients.
In the group legal services cases, the Court decided that potential users of legal services can-
not be precluded from acting in concert to obtain legal assistance. In United Transp. Union v.
State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971), Justice Harlan correctly observed that the issue was really an
economic one and that these cases involved nothing more than "a combination of purchasers of
services seeking to increase their market power." Id. at 599 (dissenting opinion).
22. In re Maclub of America, Inc., 295 Mass. 45, 3 N.E.2d 272 (1936).
23. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
24. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
25. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICs No. 47; ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY, DR 3-101(A).
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clubs attempted to provide their members with lawyers for certain situ-
ations related to the ownership and operation of automobiles, only to
have this activity held to constitute the unauthorized practice of law.26
At least one court saw precisely the "evil" that was involved: the club
"deals at wholesale" in legal services.27 In another case, a Missouri
club, cognizant of the restrictions on the practice of law by automobile
clubs, sought to appear in court on behalf of members who wanted a
continuance or to plead guilty. The service provided by the club was
purely one of convenience for its members, saving the time and trouble
of a personal appearance and involving no discretion on the part of the
court or the club representative. Even these ministerial activities were
prohibited.28
The existence and recent growth of group legal services are the
result of four decisions from 1963 to 197129 in which the United States
Supreme Court held that rules of professional ethics could not be used
to prevent groups from recommending attorneys to their constituents or
even from hiring salaried lawyers to represent their members. It is in-
structive to notice who the parties were in these suits. In three instances
complaints were filed by bar associations, 30 and in the fourth case the
suit was brought by the NAACP to restrain enforcement of a state bar-
ratry statute.3' The legal services arrangements under attack were de-
vised by a civil rights organization in one case and by labor unions in
the others. That these groups represent people who have traditionally
made minimal use of lawyers is not a coincidence. In each instance the
alternative to representation through the group was no representation
at all. Rules designed to protect the public were supported by the pro-
fession and used against the large majority of the public, which was
(and still is) unserved by lawyers.32
The resuscitation of the role of groups in the provision of legal
26. See Wiehofen, Practice of Law by Motor Clubs-UsefulBut Forbidden, 3 U. CHI. L. REV.
296 (1936).
27. In re Maclub of America, Inc., 295 Mass. 45, 49, 3 N.E.2d 272, 274 (1936).
28. Automobile Club v. Hoffmeister, 338 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
29. United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n,
389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
30. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); UMW v. Illinois State Bar
Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. I
(1964).
31. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
32. See generally B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC (1977); B. CURRAN & F.
SPAULDING, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: A PRELIMINARY REPORT OF A NATIO1NAL SUR-
VEY (1974).
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services began as an accidental by-product of the civil rights move-
ment. NAACP v. Button33 involved an attempt by the State of Virginia
to enjoin the NAACP from compensating lawyers who represented im-
pecunious litigants in school discrimination cases. The Virginia barra-
try statute, which the NAACP's activities contravened, had recently
been expanded as part of a "general plan of massive resistance to the
integration of schools of the state under the Supreme Court's de-
crees."34 The Supreme Court observed that the NAACP was seeking to
vindicate constitutional rights, and concluded that the activities of its
legal staff were modes of expression protected by the first and four-
teenth amendments, which a state could not prohibit under its power to
regulate the legal profession.35
In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar (Train-
men j),36 a scheme that involved recommendations of lawyers by a
union to injured members also was held to involve freedom of speech
and association. The union was concerned about the cost and quality
of legal assistance received by its members, as well as inadequate com-
pensation for on-the-job injuries. It identified lawyers who were exper-
ienced in employee injury work and willing to limit their fees, and then
recommended use of these attorneys to union members. The Supreme
Court saw no threat to legal ethics in this activity: "The railroad work-
ers, by recommending competent lawyers to each other, obviously are
not themselves engaged in the practice of law, nor are they or the law-
yers whom they select parties to any soliciting of business. ' 37 Nothing
more than speech and association was involved, and the first amend-
ment could not be abrogated under the guise of regulating the ethics of
the legal profession.
The UMW v. Illinois State BarAssociation38 case presented a more
difficult issue. The union employed a lawyer to represent its members
without charge in workmen's compensation cases, rather than merely
33. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
34. NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503, 515 (E.D. Va.), rev'dsub nom. Harrison v. NAACP,
360 U.S. 167 (1958). Patty was the Button case at the district court level; the Supreme Court
reversed and remanded with instructions that plaintiffs be allowed to seek an authoritative inter-
pretation by the Virginia courts of the statute in question. The Virginia Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the statute. NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 116 S.E.2d 55 (1960), rev'd
sub nonz NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). The organized bar unfortunately was a willing
accomplice in the state scheme.
35. 371 U.S. at 428-29.
36. -377 U.S. 1 (1964).
37. Id. at 6-7.
38. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
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recommending lawyers as in Trainmen I. Members were free to refuse
representation by the union lawyer and to retain another one, but at
their own expense. The Court attached little significance to this
difference:
Here, to be sure, the attorney is actually paid by the Union, not
merely the beneficiary of its recommendations. But in both situa-
tions the attorney's economic welfare is dependent to a considerable
extent on the good will of the union, and if the temptation to sacrifice
the client's best interests is stronger in the present situation, it is
stronger to a virtually imperceptible degree."
The attempt to prohibit this plan was held unconstitutional because it
would impair the associational rights of the union members and was
not needed to protect the state's interest in high standards of legal
ethics. °
These three cases, taken together, represented a frontal assault on
the bar's control over initiation of client contacts and payment for the
services of lawyers. The response of the organized bar, unveiled in its
new Code of Professional Responsibility, was recalcitrant and myopic.
Cooperation with organizations furnishing legal services was author-
ized "only in those instances and to the extent that controlling constitu-
tional interpretation at the time of the rendition of the service requires
the allowance of such legal service."'4 ' Any cooperation with a group
legal services plan beyond what was constitutionally mandated was de-
clared to constitute unethical behavior, and subjected the participating
lawyer to disciplinary sanctions.
After adoption of the Code, one further attempt at restricting col-
lective action to obtain meaningful access to the courts was made by a
state bar, but this effort was firmly rebuffed by the Supreme Court in
United Transport Union v. State Bar (Trainmen 1J).42 This decision
adds little to the legal principles adopted in the three earlier cases. Its
outcome was sufficiently predictable that a member of the ABA Com-
mittee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law was moved to observe:
For the fourth time in eight years the Supreme Court had to explain
to lawyers that the bar's powers of discipline could not be used to
39. Id. at 224. Justice Harlan, in dissent, questioned the factual validity of this conclusion.
Id. at 230-33 (dissenting opinion).
40. Id. at 225.
41. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RsPON SIBILTy, DR 2-103(D)(5) (1971) (amended 1974)
(emphasis added). Legal aid and defender plans, military legal assistance offices and approved
lawyer referral schemes were excepted. Id.
42. 401 U.S. 576 (1971). United Transport Union and Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
are different names for the same union. Id. at 577 n.l.
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restrict access to the courts. You should note the rather impatient
tone of the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Black, shared also by the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan. Evidently the Court is
getting weary of telling the bar something it should have understood
long ago.4 3
The Code's group legal services provisions have been amended twice
since the Trainmen 11 decision was handed down.44 Lawyers are now
permitted to cooperate with group plans if there is no interference by
the group in the attorney-client relationship.
C The Expansion of Legal Aid
The creation of a substantial federally funded legal services pro-
gram in the mid-1960's as part of the war on poverty was an important
precursor of the revolution in the delivery of legal services described in
this article.4 5 The organized bar, particularly the ABA, supported this
effort, though there was isolated opposition at the local and state
level.46 The legal services program provided access to the legal system
for people who could not otherwise afford it, and thereby increased
utilization of lawyers without a loss of work for private practitioners.
The assurance that potential paying clients would not be served by the
new legal services projects was a condition of ABA support.47 A few
marginal lawyers lost some legal business, but on balance the private
bar gained both clients and income because the legal services program
had an enormous educational effect.48 These projects also functioned
as a lawyer referral service; applicants who exceeded program income
guidelines were directed to private practitioners.
The legal aid experience demonstrated what was previously only a
43. Stolz, Sesame Streetfor Lawyers: A Dramatic Rendition of United Transport Union v. The
State Bar of Michigan, UNAUTH. PRAc. NEWS, Nov. 1971, at 14, 15.
44. Armstrong, supra note 1, at 1070, details the changes.
45. See E. JOHNSON, JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE OEO LEGAL
SERVICES PROGRAM (1974); Huber, Thou Shalt Not Ration Justice: A History and Bibliography of
LegalAidin America, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 754 (1976).
46. Bethel & Walker, Et Tu Brute, TENN. B.J., Aug. 1965, at 11. Some of the concern
stemmed from philosophical objections to government funding. Only a few years before the OEO
Legal Services Program was created, a former ABA president observed: "What are the trends
toward regimentation of our profession? To me, the greatest threat, aside from the undermining
influences of Communist infiltration, is the propaganda and campaign for a federal subsidy to
finance a nationwide plan for legal aid and low-cost legal service." Storey, The Legal Profession
Versus Regimentation: 4 Program to Counter Socialization, 37 A.B.A.J. 100, 101 (1951).
47. Program guidelines provided that "fee generating cases," of which tort claims are the
most obvious example, were to be referred to private lawyers.
48. The same phenomenon has been observed in England. "Far from drawing work away-
from private practitioners, law centers actually generated new clients for them." Zander, Judicare
or Staff? 4 British View, 64 A.B.A.J. 1436, 1437 (1978).
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matter of speculation: the majority of Americans, who rarely if ever
use lawyers, do have problems that are amenable to legal solutions, but
they are deterred from seeing a lawyer by concerns about cost. Within
five years attorneys in federally funded legal services projects were
handling more than one million cases per year, and most programs
were turning away large numbers of potential clients. No one had
imagined that such an enormous untapped desire for legal assistance
existed. That the services were free certainly affected the number of
people who came to legal services offices, but still the magnitude of
client response was unexpected. Faced with this deluge of clients, legal
services offices sought to expedite the handling of certain legal
problems that recurred frequently, notably divorces, landlord-tenant
disputes, and welfare matters. The use of lay advocates, paralegals,
word processing equipment, and form pleadings proved that repetitive
client matters could be processed rapidly, competently, and
inexpensively.49
Attorney independence was a major concern of the bar, and it was
met by carefully drawn program guidelines designed to ensure that no
interference with the attorney-client relationship would take place.
Over two thousand legal aid lawyers ethically serving clients with the
blessing of the bar gave lie to arguments that restrictions on group legal
services were necessary to protect the public. Apart from the source of
funding, legal services programs constitute closed panel group legal
services programs, with the program's attorneys constituting the panel
and those who meet poverty guidelines constituting the client group.
The only real difference between legal aid programs, which the bar
supported, and group plans, which the bar opposed, is that the group
plans threaten to deprive some lawyers of paying business. Both forms
of delivering legal services benefit the public and increase access to
lawyers.
D. Restraints on Competition Among Lawyers
The group legal services cases involved efforts by users of legal
services to increase their market power and to obtain better or cheaper
legal assistance. The discussion now will shift to a series of Supreme
49. The one area in which legal aid lawyers were not ahead of the private bar in the rapid
production of legal work was in the use of word processing equipment. Years of bare bones
budgets for legal aid resulted in a fortress mentality. The investment of substantial funds in capi-
tal equipment, whether for purchase or lease, was regarded as either a luxury or a waste of money.
Low secretarial salaries have for years resulted in high turnover and a staff that sometimes does
not possess the skills to operate and maintain sophisticated word processing machines.
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Court decisions between 1975 and 1978 involving restrictions on com-
petition among members of professional groups. Until these cases, pro-
fessionals prided themselves on their decision not to compete actively
with one another. Indeed, the absence of rivalry among members was
sometimes said to be one of the defining characteristics of a profession.
Roscoe Pound stated the matter clearly:
There is no such thing as competition for clientage in a profession.
Every lawyer should exert himself fully to do his tasks of advice,
representation, and advocacy to the best of his ability. But competi-
tion with fellow members of the profession in any other way is for-
bidden. Competition belongs to activities which are primarily
acquisitive. It is not allowable in those primarily for public service. 
°
The Supreme Court has now decided that under the guise of rules of
ethics professional groups, particularly lawyers, impose entirely too
many restraints on economic activity of their members. In the process
the Court abolished the doctrine that commercial advertising was "sec-
ond class" speech and therefore entitled to only limited protection
under the first amendment. 51
1. Competitive Pricing
Two decisions invalidated provisions in the codes of ethics of pro-
fessional groups that prohibited certain price competition between
group members. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,52 plaintiff success-
fully attacked bar association minimum fee schedules, which were
widely used by lawyers throughout the country. The Virginia fee
schedule was unusual only in that it was mandatory. Generally, bar
associations have been clever enough to state that fee schedules are
merely advisory.53 ABA ethics opinions have consistently taken the po-
sition that fee schedules "can only be suggested or recommended and
cannot be made obligatory."5
4
For years the bar decreed that price fixing through minimum fee
schedules was in the public interest. The Supreme Court, however,
50. R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 677-78 (1959).
51. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976), together with Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), ended the commercial speech ex-
ception to the first amendment. The leading cases presenting the former rule are Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1936), and Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
52. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
53. DR 2-106(B) lists eight factors to be considered in determining a fee, one of which is the
"fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services."
54. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 302 (1961).
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viewed mandatory minimum fee schedules, which permit price compe-
tition only above specified dollar prices, as simple price fixing on behalf
of bar members and a per se violation of the Sherman Act,5 5 rather
than as an acceptable form of professional regulation. The Court con-
ceded that the Constitution did not mandate adherence to the ideas of
Adam Smith, but it concluded that Congress had adopted competition
as part of our national policy by enacting the antitrust laws, and that
"anticompetitive conduct by lawyers is within the reach of the Sherman
Act."56 Once this conclusion was reached, bar association price fixing
was easily condemned. The public interest is in lower prices not higher
ones, and the bar was using professional regulation to increase profits
for its members rather than to benefit the public.
Another price competition case, National Society of Professional
Engineers v. United States,57 challenged the validity of a provision in
the code of ethics of the National Society of Professional Engineers that
prohibited competitive bidding between engineers for contracts. The
district court, court of appeals, and a unanimous Supreme Court all
held that this practice constituted a violation of the Sherman Act.5 8
The engineer's rule was condemned because it
[p]revents all customers from making price comparisons in the initial
selection of an engineer, and imposes the Society's views of the costs
and benefits of competition on the entire marketplace. It is this re-
straint which must be justified under the Rule of Reason, and peti-
tioner's attempt to do so on the basis of the potential threat that
competition poses to the public safety and the ethics of its profession
is nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sher-
man Act. 9
The assertion by the engineering profession that "undue" weight would
be given to price considerations was properly rejected. The society's
code establishes qualitative standards for engineers that do not vary
with the price paid by purchasers of their services. To the extent that
shoddy work by engineers is a problem, the profession has a legitimate
reason for concern, but the hiding of price information is not an effec-
tive response. It is normal in selecting among competing bidders to
take into account proposal quality, a bidder's experience, interviews
55. 421 U.S. at 782-83; see 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
56. 421 U.S. at 793.
57. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
58. See 389 F. Supp. 1193 (D.D.C. 1974), af'd, 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aj'd, 435 U.S.
679 (1978).
59. 435 U.S. at 695.
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with project managers, and a variety of other factors. The weight ac-
corded to price in this equation is best decided by the purchasers of
engineering services.
The services of attorneys are not ordinarily purchased by competi-
tive bidding, but some major users of legal services might desire to ob-
tain them in this manner. Early attempts to do precisely this were
quickly rebuffed by the bar." When a school board solicited bids for
the performance of specified legal work, the ABA Committee on Pro-
fessional Ethics ruled that submission of a bid to the school board
would be unethical. That competition among lawyers would result was
among the reasons for this conclusion.6" National Society of Profes-
sional Engineers would dictate an opposite result if a potential client
were to seek such bids today.
Read together, Goldfarb and National Society of Professional
Engineers suggest that provisions in professional codes that restrict
price competition are unlikely to survive judicial scrutiny. At a mini-
mum, it will be necessary to provide concrete evidence that the chal-
lenged practice serves the public interest.
2. Advertisements by Professionals
Consumers need information about available market alternatives
if they are to make sound decisions. Rules of professional conduct
have severely limited the information that may be disseminated to the
public. In 1976, however, a state statute that prohibited pharmacists
from advertising the price of prescription drugs was found to be incon-
sistent with first amendment rights when challenged by a consumer
group. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council,62 the Supreme Court characterized the prohibition on
price advertising as "highly paternalistic" and stated that its only effect
on a pharmacist was to "open the way for him to make a substantial,
and perhaps even excessive, profit."63 The Court chose to assume that
60. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 83 (1953); MICHIGAN
ETHICS OPINIONS, No. 133 (1950). See also H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 249-50 (1953).
61. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 292 (1957). The other reasons
given were that the dignity of the profession would be lowered and that bidding would be injuri-
ous to the administration of justice.
62. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The reasons why so much landmark litigation has involved Virginia
law are considered in Falk, Virginia Becomes a Handy Target for Lawyers Seeking Landmark
Victories Before High Court, Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 1978, at 40, col. 1.
63. 425 U.S. at 769. The Court recognized that advertising constitutes
[d]issemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product.., and
at what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the
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"people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well
enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the
channels of communication rather than to close them. 64
Chief Justice Burger, in a concurring opinion, agreed with this re-
sult because the services involved were routine. Today the pharmacist
sells primarily prepackaged products rather than producing drugs from
a supply of raw materials. Most pills and liquids are purchased in bulk
by the pharmacist and sold either as is or after repackaging into smaller
containers.
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy explicitly left open the question
whether advertising by lawyers could be banned.66 The subsequent
case of Bates v. State Bar,67 however, held that truthful advertisements
about the availability and terms of sale for routine legal services could
not be entirely prohibited, although such advertising could be regulated
in a variety of ways.
In assessing the impact of the Bates case, it is important to recog-
nize that the Code, and to a lesser extent the Canons, already permitted
a wide variety of advertising by lawyers.68 Patent, trademark and ad-
miralty lawyers,69 as well as state certified specialists,7" were already
allowed to advertise. Advertisements addressed to attorneys rather
than the general public were permitted if they appeared in professional
announcements or "reputable" law lists.7' Legal aid programs and
lawyer referral services have long been allowed to publicize their avail-
ability because no competition among lawyers is involved.72 And at-
torneys have always been permitted to communicate with existing
clients for the purpose of obtaining further business.73
allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private
economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions. . . be intelli-
gent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is
indispensable.
Id. at 765.
64. Id. at 770.
65. Id. at 773-74 (concurring opinion).
66. Id. at 773 n.25.
67. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
68. The Code condones publicity that arises incidentally from the use of office signs, business
cards, announcements of change in address or firm membership, running for elected office, profes-
sional publications and other sanctioned ways of having one's name and profession become
known. See DR 2-101(B).




73. New legal rulings may be brought to the attention of existing clients but not to others, for
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Within a year after the Goldfarb decision, the ABA had amended
the Code to permit specified lawyer advertising directed to the general
public. 74 Among the information that an attorney could convey was
office location, current clients (with their consent), limitation of prac-
tice, schools attended, languages spoken, fee for initial consultation,
and availability of credit arrangements. It is thus clear that the bar had
largely abandoned attempts to prohibit advertising before the Bates de-
cision. The present rule is that lawyer advertising is permitted,75 with a
few exceptions,76 even though the Code does not say so explicitly.
3. Solicitation of Clients
The difference between advertising and solicitation is one of de-
gree. The former involves dissemination of information to a large
group of potential clients and the latter involves a message addressed to
one person, or occasionally a small group.77 The disdain solicitation
evokes is based primarily on concern about a single situation: the ob-
taining of legal business from recently injured persons, most often as
the result of an automobile or job-related accident. This "ambulance
chasing" involves a number of unsavory practices. Some lawyers em-
ploy "runners" or "investigators" to obtain the clients, in violation of
the Code. Payment is made to ambulance drivers, wreckers, hospital
personnel, and others who steer business to a lawyer, even though these
payments are prohibited by the Code.78 Payments to public officials,
notably police officers, and other violations of the criminal law are a
frequent concomitant of ambulance chasing.7 9 Potential clients are
that would amount to thinly disguised advertising. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPIN-
IONS, No. 213 (1941); ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, RECENT ETHICS OPINIONS, Infor-
mal Opinion No. 1356 (Nov. 25, 1975). "Periodic notices might be sent to the client for whom a
lawyer has drawn a will, suggesting that it might be wise for the client to reexamine his will to
determine whether or not there has been any change in his situation requiring a modification of
the will." ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 210 (1941).
74. DR 2-102(A)(5). Smith, Making the Availability of Legal Services Better Known, 62
A.B.A.J. 855 (1976), traces the developments leading to this change.
75. See EC 2-9, -10; DR 2-101 to -105.
76. DR 2-101 to -103, -105.
77. Solicitation of clients is not limited to our legal system. Mahatma Gandhi discovered
analogous practices when he began to practice law in Bombay.
He was shocked to discover that not only the most humble vakils but also the most
exhalted barristers all obtained cases by paying touts, who hung about the court. Gan-
dhi felt that the touts were a disgrace to the profession, and refused to have anything to
do with them, so for several months he did not get a single case.
Mehta, Mahatma Gandhi and His Apostles, NEw YORKER, May 17, 1976, at 38, 52.
78. DR 2-103(B).
79. These and other horribles associated with ambulance chasing are considered in Huber,
Ambulance Chasing, Hous. LAw., Sept. 1976, at 10; Saden, Inquiry Into Ambulance Chasing, 34
19791
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
pressured into retaining a lawyer they do not know and may not want
or need. Frequently, the potential client is unable to make a sound
decision because of the effects of the accident or of drugs being used in
treatment. o
In two companion cases involving the alleged solicitation of cli-
ents, the Supreme Court stated again that competition among profes-
sionals was required only when it serves the public interest. In In re
Primus, a state bar attempted to discipline a lawyer who, working in
cooperation with the American Civil Liberties Union, sought to sue the
Medicaid program in connection with the sterilization of certain wo-
men. These facts are similar to those in NAACP v. Button in that an
attorney was raising constitutional issues; the Supreme Court had no
difficulty in holding that the lawyer could not be punished for her
activities.
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association8" involved a classic instance
of ambulance chasing. The business of the driver of a car and her pas-
senger was vigorously sought, both at a hospital and at their homes.
Pressure was put on both of the injured parties and their parents. The
driver verbally retained Ohralik, who used a hidden tape recorder to
memorialize her consent, but she dismissed him a short time later. The
client eventually paid legal fees to both Ohralik and the lawyer she
subsequently retained. Ohralik argued that he had engaged in consti-
tutionally protected advertising.83 This claim is not implausible, for
one can view solicitation as advertising focused on a very small audi-
ence instead of directed at the general public. It differs from conven-
tional advertising, however, in that the message is delivered personally,
and involves pressure on the individual being solicited, who is often
particularly vulnerable to persuasion because of the recent accident.
The Supreme Court emphasized that it was dealing with "in-person"
solicitation. This involves a disservice to both individual and societal
CONN. B.J. 117 (1960); Schizer, The Brooklyn Judicial Inquiry" .4 Record of Accomplishment, 29
BROOKLYN L. REV. 27 (1962); Comment, Settlement of Personal njury Cases in the Chicago Area,
47 Nw. L. REV. 895 (1953). See also In re Mitgang, 385 IU. 311, 52 N.E.2d 807 (1944); In re
Perrello, 260 Ind. 254, 295 N.E.2d 357, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973); Kentucky State Bar Ass'n
v. Donoghoe, 486 S.W.2d 703 (Ky. 1972); In re Greathouse, 189 Minn. 51, 248 N.W. 735 (1933);
Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 859 (1959).
80. Employers and insurance adjusters also use pressure tactics. Ambulance chasing is some-
times justified as a way to protect people from waiving important rights. See M. FREEDMAN,
LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 113-25 (1975); Note, Legal Ethics-.4mbulance
Chasing, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 182 (1955).
81. 436 U.S. 412 (1978). Only Justice Rehnquist dissented.
82. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
83. Id. at 455.
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interests because it hinders rather than facilitates "informed and relia-
ble decision-making," and is therefore a proper subject for state
regulation.84
E. Competition and Professional Services Today
This completes the review of recent decisions dealing with compe-
tition in the market for professional services. The Supreme Court has
recognized the anticompetitive effect of a number of prohibitions con-
tained in the ethical codes of lawyers and other professionals and has
declared them to be unconstitutional or in violation of the antitrust
laws. The Court has concluded that the public interest is best served by
vigorous competition rather than by severe economic restrictions, even
if those restrictions are legislatively sanctioned.
Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, concurring in National Society
of ProfessionalEngineers, disagreed with the majority's intimation that
"any ethical rule with an overall anticompetitive effect promulgated by
a professional society is forbidden."85 The majority opinion continued
the Court's adherence to the view that a state may conclude that "forms
of competition usual in the business world may be demoralizing to the
ethical standards of a professional," and therefore a state may regulate
or even ban some competitive activity.8 6 The subsequent decision in
Ohralik constitutes evidence that the Court is really willing to treat
professionals differently from other businesses, at least in the context of
in-person solicitation. A similar restriction outside the professional
context would clearly violate the Sherman Act. But Ohralik also dem-
onstrates that the Court will uphold a professional rule that limits com-
petition only when the rule serves the public interest. 7
II. THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS: RECOMMENDATIONS
The focus of attention will now shift from past challenges of ethi-
cal restrictions to an examination of restraints presently in the Code.
The Code still contains numerous provisions that have no place in a
body of rules on professional conduct because they have little or no
84. Id. at 457-58 (quoting Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. at 364).
85. 435 U.S. at 699 (concurring opinion).
86. United States v. Oregon State Medical Soe'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952), quoted with ap-
proval in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. at 792; accord, National Soe'y of Professional
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. at 696.
87. This principle would not preclude controls over a form of legal practice if in the public
interest. For example, law firms are commonly permitted to incorporate, but they may not limit
their liability to clients. DR 6-102.
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justification except as restraints on economic activity. These will be
considered under four headings: forms of practice; obtaining business;
fee arrangements between attorneys and clients; and financial dealings
between lawyers and nonclients. In each instance it will be argued that
present restrictions should be eliminated unless they are demonstrably
beneficial to the public.
The evaluative standard will be different from that used by the
courts, which assesses existing professional norms according to whether
they comport with statutory and constitutional requirements. The dis-
cussion here will focus on what ought to be the content of professional
rules for lawyers.88 Since it will be recommended that a number of
restrictions contained in the Code be eliminated, the presentation be-
low will be organized around an examination of the relevant Code pro-
visions. A reconsideration of the special rules of behavior for lawyers
presents a good opportunity for the profession to complete the job that
the courts have begun.
4. Forms of Practice
The Code limits the manner in which legal assistance may be de-
livered. Despite the group legal services cases discussed earlier, some
unwarranted restraints on group plans remain. Restrictions on owner-
ship interests by nonlawyers in organizations that practice law and on
the simultaneous practice of law and another profession should also be
eliminated. Certain restrictions on business relations with clients are
appropriate and should be retained.
1. Group Legal Services89
Limitations on the existence and operation of group legal plans are
88. These recommendations are not necessarily mandated by the Sherman Act, the first
amendment or other legal standards.
89. The development of group legal plans, many of which are financed through prepayments
by group members, is dictated by rules having little to do with the practice of law. Whether the
prepayment feature constitutes "insurance" is a question of more than academic interest because
in some states it will determine whether plans are subject to state insurance regulations. See, e.g.,
Feinstein v. Attorney Gen., 36 N.Y.2d 221, 326 N.E.2d 288, 366 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1975).
Groups have been and will continue to be developed in the employment context because of
the favorable tax treatment given to employer contributions. Neither the money paid to a
qualifying group legal services plan nor the value of legal assistance provided under such a plan
constitutes income to the employee. I.R.C. § 120. Plans must qualify under I.R.C. § 501(c)(20).
Labor unions have taken the lead in creating prepaid group legal plans because their members
have typically been unable to afford private lawyers, but were too well off for legal aid. Collective
bargaining about legal services as a fringe benefit is allowed by national labor legislation. Labor
Management Relations Act § 302(c), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(8) (1976).
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largely a matter of history. Two restrictions still remain that may be
inconsistent with articulated Supreme Court standards and that should
in any event be excluded from the Standards.
The Code appears to. permit cooperation by lawyers with a plan
that furnishes legal services to its members only if the plan includes an
"opt-out" provision, which permits members to be reimbursed for re-
taining counsel outside the normal framework of the plan.90 Since the
plan that the Supreme Court approved in UMW v. Illinois State Bar
provided free legal assistance from a single attorney employed by the
union but did not include an opt-out provision, the limitation in the
Code appears to be clearly unconstitutional. The requirement that an
opt-out provision be included also endangers the economic basis of
group plans because they depend on volume handling of the repetitive
problems that frequently arise in representing a relatively homogene-
ous group, such as railway or mining employees. Ethical rules should
not hinder the efficient handling of these repetitive legal matters.
The Code prohibits lawyers from creating groups for which they
will then do legal work.9' The result is that existing groups can obtain
inexpensive legal services for their members, while those people who
are not organized into large groups, and who therefore may be most in
need of assistance, are left out. By prohibiting lawyers from forming
group legal plans, the Code excludes those who are most likely to have
the knowledge and desire to create them. One hopes that lawyers can
create group plans at least as well as others, and therefore permitting
this activity would better serve the public interest than precluding it.
Accordingly, the Standards should allow lawyers to participate in the
formation of groups for which they will perform legal services, subject
to the rules concerning solicitation.
2. Ownership of a Law Practice
The Code permits only attorneys to share in profits earned from
the practice of law.92 The public interest surely does not require that
lawyers be granted a monopoly over the profits of lawyering, and such
a limitation should not appear in the Standards. If price is low and
quality of service is high, clients will be happy whether the profit
90. DR 2-103(D)(4)(e).
91. DR 2-103(D)(4)(b).
92. DR 3-102, 5-107(C)(1). Employees of a lawyer or law firm, however, may be included in
a retirement plan even though it is based on a profit-sharing arrangement. DR 3-102(3); ABA
COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 311 (1964).
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earned goes to lawyers or others. There is no evidence that an owner-
ship interest by nonlawyers in a law firm will lead to unethical prac-
tices. Attorneys are required to exercise independent judgment on
behalf of clients, and complete fidelity is owed to the client irrespective
of how or by whom the attorney is compensated.93 There is no neces-
sary relationship between attorney independence in serving clients and
financial arrangements for the payment of services or the manner in
which payments are subsequently divided. The pressure of large
caseloads in legal aid societies and of "command influence" on mili-
tary, government, and corporation lawyers are as strong as potential
pressures from profit-oriented nonlawyer owners. The drive to make
money is often strong in law firms, and promotion from associate to
partner frequently depends on the amount of billings that an attorney
generates.94 The duty of fidelity to individual clients is a valid and
important principle, but it can be retained without regard to who shares
the profits generated by a law practice.
The rule against nonlawyer ownership precludes some possibly
useful legal practice arrangements. Restricting the provision of legal
services on a for-profit basis to entities owned entirely by lawyers pre-
cludes a major retailer such as Sears or H & R Block from hiring attor-
neys and attempting to make a profit through the sale of legal services,
as Sears does with insurance and Block does with tax advice. A law
school graduate seeking to obtain funds to start a practice is permitted
to give the lender a debt but not an equity interest in the law practice.
It cannot be seriously argued that this distinction is necessary to protect
the public or to ensure ethical lawyering. The present rule may work to
the detriment of new lawyers seeking to start their own practices, par-
ticularly when interest rates are high or loan capital is scarce.
Included among the Code provisions that direct lawyers to assist in
the prevention of the unauthorized practice of law is a prohibition
against dividing legal fees with a nonlawyer.95 This ban is justified in
the following manner: "Since a lawyer should not aid or encourage a
layman to practice law, he should not. . . share fees with a layman." 96
The conclusion simply does not follow from th& premise. Practicing
93. DR 5-107(B), (C)(3).
94. One major Houston law firm prints and distributes to its lawyers on a monthly basis the
billings of every attorney in the firm.
95. See DR 3-102.
96. EC 3-8. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 34 embodied the same rule.
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law is one thing; sharing in the proceeds from the practice is quite an-
other. If evidence existed that the division of legal fees or profits from
a law practice frequently led to unauthorized practice or to inferior cli-
ent service, such restrictions might be justified.97 Absent demonstrated
harm, the prohibition should be eliminated.
3. Dual Practice
Two distinct but similar situations are considered here. One is the
practice of law and another occupation in partnership by two separate
individuals, and the other is the practice of law together with another
occupation by one person.
Although it is sometimes useful for a lawyer to work jointly with
other professionals, the Code provides that lawyers are prohibited from
forming partnerships with nonlawyers if any of the partnership activi-
ties constitute the practice of law.98 For example, lawyers may be part
of business consulting teams, which provide users with an array of ex-
pertise. Such partnerships easily avoid the Code restriction by billing
separately for "legal" work. The net result is no more than to compli-
cate needlessly the bookkeeping involved in the provision of a useful
service.
An important aspect of the rule against forming a partnership with
a nonlawyer has been the concern that the nonlawyer practitioner,
whose profession might not prohibit advertising, would channel legal
business to the attorney, and thereby evade the rule against advertising.
Since attorneys may now advertise for clients, this justification is no
longer relevant, and the prohibition should be abolished. If the non-
lawyer partner engages in conduct prohibited by the Standards, the at-
torney partner would be accountable in the same manner as he is
presently responsible for the actions of his agents, employees, and
partners.
The simultaneous practice of law and another business or profes-
sion is permitted by the Code, but only if the attorney carefully dis-
guises his dual practice.99 Again, the major concern has been
97. The prohibition on the division of fees with laymen is particularly suspect in a jurisdic-
tion such as Texas, which permits fee splitting with other lawyers. See Texas Code of Professional
Responsibility, DR 2-107, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-1 app. (Vernon 1973).
98. DR 3-103; ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICs No. 33. This rule is a specific appli-
cation of the principle that legal fees may not be divided with a nonlawyer.
99. DR 2-102(E).
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circumvention of advertising restrictions, and the use of the other occu-
pation to "feed" the law practice. After the Bates case and the recent
amendments to DR 2-101, which permit an attorney to state extensive
information including technical and professional licenses, and mem-
berships in scientific, technical and professional associations, this rule
has been effectively repealed. '00 The Standards should do so explicitly.
4. Business Relations With Clients
The Code imposes special duties on lawyers who participate in
business activities with their clients. 101 When the interests of the law-
yer and client differ, and the client expects the lawyer to exercise legal
judgment on the client's behalf, then full disclosure to and consent by
the client are required. This rule prevents conflicts of interest without
unduly limiting the activities of lawyers, and should be retained in the
Standards. Some law firms take the position that they will never as-
sume the dual role of advisor to and coparticipant with a client in a
business venture.
B. Obtaining Business
The Code and Canons both included rules about the manner in
which lawyers could obtain business (advertising, solicitation) and also
about work reserved exclusively for lawyers (unauthorized practice).
These will be considered in turn.
1. Advertising
The Bates case, together with the amendments to the Code re-
cently adopted by the ABA, have abolished many restrictions on law-
yer advertising. 02 The Code prohibits publicity by or on behalf of an
attorney except as allowed by its provisions, although the exceptions
have largely consumed the rule.'03 The Standards should adopt the
opposite approach and permit advertising subject to enumerated limi-
tations. All advertising that is not false, deceptive, or misleading
should be allowed unless specific harm is demonstrated.
100. See DR 2-101(B)(12), (13) (adopted Aug. 1977, 63 A.B.A.J. 1234, 1235 (1977)).
101. DR 5-104(A).
102. Changes in this area have come so rapidly that the present rules about attorney advertis-
ing vary substantially between states. This is the only topic discussed in this article in which the
position adopted by the Code is not accepted almost universally in American jurisdictions.
103. DR 2-101, refprinted in 63 A.B.A.J. 1234, 1235 (1977).
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The current state of advertising rules can be conveniently consid-
ered through an examination of the information a lawyer may want to
convey to the public. The most important message is that the lawyer
exists and that he can be found at the given address."° In addition,
potential clients will want to know the type of work a lawyer does, the
amount charged, and that the lawyer provides quality services. Al-
though Bates covered only price advertising of routine legal services in
newspapers, the Standards should specifically permit all accurate price
information. If an hourly fee is stated correctly (for example, "we
charge $50 per hour"), it should not matter whether the legal services
involved are "routine." The same is true if a contingent fee is accu-
rately advertised. Stating a flat rate for a particular service, such as
preparing a will, is not misleading or unfair so long as the attorney
performs the advertised service for the amount stated. Statement of a
minimum price ($150 and up) should also be allowed. If the public can
be trusted to survive the blandishments of the automobile industry, it
can also deal with truthful advertisements by lawyers.
Amendments to the Code adopted in 1977 permit an attorney to
advertise that his practice is limited to certain areas of law. 05 States
should adopt lists of identifying labels for types of legal work, the use
of which would be mandatory for lawyers who want to state that they
limit their practice. Such a truth-in-labeling rule is necessary for mean-
ingful information to be conveyed to consumers.
The major remaining concern about lawyer advertising relates to
statements about quality. This concern is unfQunded. Professional
licensure guarantees a basic level of competence; with that protection
clients can make decisions about lawyers as capably as they decide
about other major expenditures. If a lawyer chooses to promise more
than "best efforts," a warranty will be created. If a lawyer guarantees a
certain result, failure to achieve it will constitute a breach of con-
tract. 106 Most quality claims, however, are likely to be mere puffs (for
104. The advertisement that probably brought the most business to a law firm said nothing
specific about price or quality of services.
The Dan Walker Law Office has been established by former Governor Walker in eight
cities in Illinois. The United States Supreme Court has decided that for the first time
lawyers may advertise in newspapers, with certain limitations. The Supreme Court rea-
soned, and we agree. that legal services should be available to more people at a reason-
able rate. We offer a broad range of legal services to people and businesses across the
state. [Firm name, address and telephone numbers followed.]
Chicago Sun Times, July 3, 1977, at 5, col. 4.
105. DR 2-101(B)(2), -105(A)(2), reprinted in 63 A.B.A.J. 1234, 1235 (1977).
106. Cf. Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929)(doctor-patient relationship). See
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example, "we do a wonderful job" rather than actionable promises. At
worst, this is unhelpful to the consumer. Unless one wants to argue
that incomplete information is worse than none at all, however, re-
straints on advertising of price or quality of legal services are unjustifi-
able. As has already been demonstrated, the Supreme Court has
become hostile to the argument that restricting market information
benefits the public. At most, disclaimers should be required; these are
probably unnecessary, but they represent a substantial improvement
over a prohibition on information about quality. 0 7 Attorney advertis-
ing is subject to existing consumer protection and deceptive trade prac-
tice laws. The Standards might provide that the violation of such rules
constitutes unprofessional conduct.
The opinion of the Court in Bates specifically set aside use of the
broadcast media for lawyer advertising as potentially warranting spe-
cial treatment.0 8 The 1977 Code amendments authorized radio adver-
tisements.'0 9 Several states also permitted television advertising" 0
without apparent ill effects, and in 1978 the ABA House of Delegates
approved its use by a wide margin."' There has been little sustained
use of television advertising,12 largely because the purchase of televi-
sion time is so expensive." 13 Lawyers interested in television advertis-
ing are likely to make increasing use of UHF or cable channels, which
reach a more localized audience and charge substantially less for their
time than VHF stations.
The bar should gracefully retreat from the whole area of lawyer
advertising, making provision in the Standards only for a prohibition
of false, misleading, or deceptive advertisements. On balance, advertis-
ing is good for both the profession and the public.
also Steinberg & Rosen, Lawyers'Advertising and Warranties: Caveat Advocatus, 64 A.B.A.J. 867
(1978).
107. The experience with health warnings on cigarette advertisements leads one to be skeptical
of whether disclaimers effectively communicate information.
108. 433 U.S. at 384.
109. DR 2-101(B), reprintedin 63 A.B.A.J. 1234, 1235 (1977).
110. 64 A.B.A.J. 1341 (1978).
111. Id.
112. Hochberger, Lawyer Advertising-Update After One Year, N.Y.L.J., June 26, 1978, at 1,
col. 4. Hochberger concludes that the impact of Bates on a national basis has been minor. Id. at
2, col. 5.
113. Advertisements in the yellow pages of the telephone book and in newspapers of general
circulation are also expensive. In large ciies a local audience might be reached most effectively by
advertisements in community papers. Lawyers who specialize in the legal problems of specific
groups or industries might advertise in their trade publications. See id. at 1, col. 4.
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2. Solicitation
An understanding of when and why solicitation occurs is a neces-
sary predicate to determining what, if anything, should be done about
it. Solicitation is expensive in most situations and would not occur
even if permitted by the Code. Ambulance chasing is the classic, and
most reprehensible, form of solicitation' 14 It involves several features
that make it attractive for business-seeking lawyers. The injured per-
son is very likely to need a lawyer and to recognize this. The likelihood
of that person being already represented by counsel is relatively low
because the event causing the injury was unplanned. Conveniently, the
injured potential clients are transported to centrally located hospitals.
Most important, a lawyer need not be concerned about his injured cli-
ent's financial status because the case, if brought to a successful conclu-
sion, will produce a res out of which the attorney's fee can be paid.
Widespread solicitation is unlikely to occur when this fortuitous combi-
nation of circumstances is absent.
Lawyers, like others who earn a living by selling something, long
ago discovered that if they were gregarious and spent time with poten-
tial buyers the result might be to generate some business. If at a cock-
tail party a lawyer states his profession to a person who then mentions
a problem whereupon the lawyer says he can help, has the advice of the
lawyer been sought or is impermissible solicitation involved? The an-
swer in practice is that such activity is acceptable, though it can be
argued that the Code, which provides that for an attorney to recom-
mend himself "to a non-lawyer who has not sought his advice regard-
ing employment of a lawyer" constitutes prohibited solicitation, 1 5
requires the opposite conclusion. While professionals who constantly
talk about their work may be regarded as boorish, dull or even rude,
they are not unethical. If overreaching is the concern or if the Code
114. Ambulance chasing has no real defenders apart perhaps from some lawyers who benefit
from it. The closest thing to support is M. FREEDMAN, supra note 80 (chapter titled Access to the
Legal Syster The Professional Responsibility to Chase Ambulances). More recently Professor
Freedman has recommended that the Code (1) eliminate restrictions on solicitation; (2) urge dig-
nity in advertising; (3) prohibit communications with potential clients that violate valid laws or
regulations, or would breach an obligation of a third person through whom he communicates
(eg., hospital employees, peace officers); and (4) forbid solicitation of those who prefer to be left
alone. Freedman, Advertising and Solicitation by Lawyers: 4 Proposed Redraft of Canon 2 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, 4 HoFsTRA L. REV. 183, 198-203 (1976).
In the course of investigating ambulance chasing, the author spoke with several hospital ad-
ministrators. Their chief concern about ambulance chasers was the problems they caused in oper-
ating the hospital, sometimes even endangering the lives of patients. See, Huber, supra note 79.
115. DR 2-103(A).
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provision is designed to protect a potential client from making an un-
wise or hurried decision, a solution might be to require the contract of
employment to be in writing or to provide a "cooling off" period as is
done with sales in the home.
The prohibitions on seeking clients reflect a concern about the
conflict of interest inherent in a lawyer suggesting the need for legal
services and then performing the recommended work. The circum-
stances under which the client agrees to be represented by the lawyer
are not a material consideration. In evaluating encounters between
lawyers and potential clients, the Code makes no distinction between
the person who is pressured into immediately becoming a client and the
person who becomes a client by telephoning the attorney several days
after their encounter. Only the former situation warrants regulation,
because it involves in-person solicitation.
A final form of activity that arguably involves solicitation is direct
mail. Letters containing the sender's message are mailed to the homes
of selected individuals. For example, an attorney commencing practice
in a town might desire to communicate his availability to the thousand
richest people in the vicinity, on the theory that they are likely to be
particularly desirable clients. A lawyer opening an office in a suburban
area might want to notify nearby residents of this fact. In either in-
stance assume the attorney writes a standardized letter containing in-
formation that would comply with the Code's advertising provisions if
published in a newspaper advertisement. The letter is reproduced on a
word processing unit so that each copy is individually typed, and each
is signed by the attorney. Solicitation has two central aspects: a
message directed to an individual and in-person delivery of that
message. Only the latter aspect is objectionable, for it is personal con-
tact that creates pressure. The Supreme Court in Ohralik emphasized
that the evil involved with solicitation was the pressure inherent with
in-person contacts. Personalized letters to potential clients should be
permitted, though the Code now prohibits their use. Direct mail prob-
ably is constitutionally indistinguishable from the advertisement sanc-
tioned in Bates."6
Solicitation is a greater problem in jurisdictions that allow full
contract damages to an attorney who has been dismissed by a solicited
116. See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978).
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client than in those jurisdictions that limit recovery to the value of serv-
ices actually rendered. The law of contract, as well as ethical proscrip-
tions in the Standards, should be used to curb in-person solicitation by
attorneys and their agents. "Cooling off" legislation might be adopted,
though the efficacy of such statutes is open to question. Permitting cli-
ents to void contracts with attorneys entered into within one week after
an accident or while hospitalized would have a dramatic effect on ex-
isting practices. Oral contracts of employment might also be treated as
voidable by clients. 17
3. Unauthorized Practice of Law
Unauthorized practice committees were born in a time of eco-
nomic hardship to ensure that the profession did not lose business.'
18
No more than sporadic concern about unauthorized practice was ex-
pressed prior to 1930 when the ABA created its Committee on Unau-
thorized Practice."I9 The organized bar has been active ever since in
preventing competition 2 ' from outside groups.'21 Emphasis has been
on precisely those areas of practice in which other groups can perform
almost as well as lawyers, such as the sale of residential property by
117. Waivers, releases and settlements should be voidable for a similar period of time.
118. Symposium, The "UnauthorizedPractice ofLaw" Controversy, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
1, 2 (1938).
119. Bristol, The Parsing of the Legal Profession, 22 YALE L.J. 590 (1913), is an exception.
Bristol observed that much legal business was being lost to title insurance companies and the trust
departments of banks. He decried the loss of this "lucrative" work to other institutions that would
do the work less expensively. He ends beseechingly:
And, my good brothers in law, you who are still within the pale of the profession, unin-
corporated and free to think for yourselves, how do you like it? Shall we continue to
practice law as a profession, honor its traditions, cherish and live up to its high ideals,
and die poor, or shall we fall in line with our more progressive brothers, pass over into
the business world incorporate-exploit the public-and live rich?
Id. at 613.
120. This point of view is, of course, disclaimed by the bar. A former president of the ABA
has observed:
Our concern in this subject matter [unauthorized practice] is governed by broad consid-
erations of social policy and the public interest. It must not be motivated by selfishness
• . . or by avaricious materialism. The lawyer who thinks that unauthorized practice
work is simply a means for increasing his own income has no place in this discussion.
We are here to protect the public from the hidden dangers of dealing with the unli-
censed and unauthorized practitioner, not to protect the lawyer from competition.
Marden, The American Bar and Unauthorized Practice, UNAUTH. Pc c. NEws, Spring 1967, at 1,
2.
121. Often cartel arrangements, known as the "conference system," were entered into with
other professional groups. The conference system is described in Perry, Report of the Standing
Committee on Unauthorized Practice o/Law, UNAUTH. PRsc. NEws, Spring 1963, at 1. Agree-
ments with other professions appear in 7 MARTINDALE HUBBELL, LAw DIREcToRY 71m (1978).
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real estate brokers 22 or divorce services that sell forms and surrepti-
tiously give "legal" advice to the purchasers. 123 For many routine legal
tasks, performance of all the work by an individual lawyer is expensive
and inefficient. To obtain these legal services at a lower cost, much of
the work must be performed by nonlawyers. Paralegals are permitted
to perform nearly all tasks related to serving a client except for court
appearances, so long as they do it under the supervision and control of
a lawyer. 124 A few law firms already employ several paralegals for
every lawyer, in addition to other support staff. Some legal assistance
can be provided quite inexpensively if a large volume of the same or
similar work is involved. Largely because of the advent of group plans
and lawyer advertising, this possibility is becoming a reality. 25
The definition of what constitutes unauthorized practice remains a
matter of state law, however. The Code simply provides that a lawyer
should not aid a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law. 126 So
long as a state determines that certain activity is impermissible, the
Standards cannot institute less restrictive unauthorized practice rules.
Only a change in state law can accomplish this objective.
C Financial Arrangements: Attorney and Client
The Code contains several provisions that unnecessarily limit the
range of permitted fee arrangements between attorney and client. The
Code states that fees should not be excessive, and a lawyer can be sanc-
tioned for charging a "clearly excessive" fee. 27 Apart from doubts
about whether the modifier "clearly" is needed, the rule is unobjection-
able, but it is also so general that it is unenforceable. In a reasonably
competitive market for legal services, excessive fees will not be a prob-
lem except in isolated instances, and consumer protection laws should
suffice to deal with these. To the extent that the objective is to protect
unsophisticated consumers from being overcharged, rules of profes-
sional behavior that cover only the conduct of attorneys are not the best
vehicle for achieving the desired result. Many of the prohibitions on
122. See, e.g., Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, 34 Ill. 2d 116, 214 N.E.2d 771 (1966).
123. See, e.g., People v. Divorce Associated & Publishing, Ltd., 95 Misc. 2d 340,407 N.Y.S.2d
142 (Sup. Ct. 1978). The Florida State Bar Association spent $94,000 to employ an attorney and
four investigators last year to ferret out the unauthorized practice of law. Brill, Divorce, Florida
Style, ESQUIRE, July 4, 1978, at 14.
124. EC 3-6.
125. Falk, Legal Upheaval- Lawyers Are Facing Surge in Competition as Courts Drop Curbs,
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financial arrangements between attorneys and others appear to exist
primarily if not totally for the protection of the bar. The key question
in evaluating prohibited financial arrangements is whether they involve
an actual or potential conflict of interest among the parties thereto, and
if so, whether the conflict is sufficiently serious to warrant regulation.128
When no substantial conflict can be demonstrated, contractual agree-
ments should be permitted, subject to generally applicable consumer
protection laws.
1. Contingent Fees
The Code states the general principle that "[a] lawyer shall not
acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of
litigation he is conducting for a client."'129 The most important excep-
tion is that attorneys are permitted to enter into contingent fee agree-
ments with clients, which provide for the attorney to receive a
percentage of the client's recovery. 30 This permits worthy claimants to
bring suit even though they otherwise could not afford to retain a law-
yer. Unfortunately, some lawyers have charged exorbitant fees, upon
occasion exceeding fifty percent. Courts can regulate contingent fee
practices, including the imposition of maximum fees, and a few courts
have done so.' 31 Lawyers should present solvent clients with the alter-
native of an hourly fee for service or a contingent fee arrangement.
Contingent fee abuses, often associated with ambulance chasing, can
and should be curbed, but the general use of contingent fees should be
retained.
Contingent fees are prohibited in criminal cases.1 32 This provision
is of little consequence because lawyers would not utilize such a fee
arrangement even if permitted to do so. This rule is an example of
"self-paternalism" by the bar to protect its members from their own
lack of foresight. Many criminal defendants are poor and desperate,
and some lawyers might, in a moment of weakness or generosity, enter
128. In one sense all fee arrangements between lawyer and client involve a conflict of interest
because the more the lawyer receives the more the client must pay. Courts could set fees and
publish fee schedules, as the English have done for centuries.
129. DR 5-103(A).
130. EC 2-20; DR 5-103(A)(2). Contingent fees are forbidden in England. The arguments for
and against their use are presented in Youngwood, The Contingent Fee-Reasonable Alternative?,
28 MOD. L. REv. 330 (1965).
131. Maximum fee schedules were upheld in American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey
Supreme Court, 66 N.J. 258, 330 A.2d 350 (1974), and Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 160 N.E.2d 43,
185 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1959), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 374 (1960).
132. DR 2-106(C).
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into a contingent fee arrangement with a client. Unlike tort cases,
wherein contingent fees are used most frequently, criminal cases do not
produce a res from which the attorney can obtain a fee.133 It has been
suggested that the use of contingent fees in criminal cases presents a
danger of corrupting justice, 134 but there is no concrete evidence to sup-
port this proposition. The prohibition against contingent fees in crimi-
nal cases should be omitted from the Standards. It may be foolish to
accept criminal cases on a contingency basis, but doing so should not
be treated as unethical.
The Code discourages, but does not prohibit, the use of contingent
fees in domestic relations cases.1 35 Nevertheless, such arrangements
are frequently utilized. When divorce itself is the contingency, a law-
yer is in the unfortunate position of having a large financial stake in the
dissolution of the marriage. This situation is worth serious investiga-
tion to determine whether important societal values are threatened by
the use of contingent fees in family law cases.'3 6
2. Royalties
An attorney may not receive as his fee an interest in a publication
concerning the subject matter of his employment.'37 A detailed justifi-
cation is provided for this rule:
If, in the course of his representation of a client, a lawyer is permitted
to receive from his client a beneficial ownership in publication rights
relating to the subject matter of the employment, he may be tempted
to subordinate the interests of his client to his own anticipated pecu-
niary gain. For example, a lawyer in a criminal case who obtains
from his client ... publication rights with respect to the case may be
influenced, consciously or unconsciously, to a course of conduct that
will enhance the value of his publication rights to the prejudice of his
client. 138
133. In rare cases a fund of money may become available after an acquittal. A beneficiary of
an insurance policy who is accused of murdering the insured may be entitled to the proceeds of
the policy only if he is not convicted. The proceeds of a trust might be payable only if the claim-
ant has never been convicted of a felony.
134. Peyton v. Margiotti, 398 Pa. 86, 90, 156 A.2d 865, 867 (1959). Perhaps the fear is that the
acquitted defendant will be forced to commit a crime to pay his attorney.
135. "Because of the human relationships involved and the unique character of the proceed-
ings, contingent fee arrangements in domestic relation cases are rarely justified." EC 2-20.
136. The experience in Texas, which permits contingent fees in family cases, appears satisfac-
tory, but the issue requires ajudgment that is considerably more informed than that of the author.
See Texas Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-106(c), 5-103(A)(2), TEx. REV. Civ. STAT.
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In a legal system that commonly uses contingent fees, that regu-
larly permits a lawyer to represent codefendants in criminal cases, and
that sanctions the representation of insured persons by attorneys se-
lected and paid for by insurers, it is surprising that the royalty situation
should be singled out for special treatment. A royalty agreement is un-
likely to create a conflict of interest between attorney and client, or to
endanger the proper functioning of the justice system, though it may
offend the dignity of the profession, especially if given prominent no-
tice by the media. The Standards should not retain the prohibition
against royalty agreements between attorney and client, although it
does not follow that they are to be encouraged. Of course, if a lawyer
does not pursue his client's best interests he will be subject to discipline
under other provisions in the Standards, regardless of the fee arrange-
ments involved.
3. Loans to Clients
Attorneys are permitted to pay costs related to litigation and trial
preparation on behalf of their clients so long as the client bears ulti-
mate responsibility for these expenses.139 An attorney may not, how-
ever, advance funds to a client for other purposes, such as living
expenses. 40 There is much to be said for this position as a sound way
to run a law practice. The object of practicing law is to get paid by
clients, not to pay them. Legal fees are difficult to collect in the best of
circumstances, and the client who needs to borrow money is the very
one who is least likely to pay an attorney. Expenditures of money in
connection with a client's business are directed toward completion of
the legal work that is the basis for earning a fee. Loans to clients for
other purposes are far less likely to be beneficial to the lawyer. The
rule against loans to clients is another example of self-paternalism in
the Code. It serves as a crutch for soft-hearted lawyers, who can re-
spond to imploring clients, "I would love to help you out, but rules of
professional ethics prohibit me from doing so."
Although the rule against loans to clients is rarely enforced, it has
upon occasion been used to discipline lawyers who advance money to
indigent clients. 4 I In labeling as unethical a lawyer who acts as a good
139. DR 5-103(B).
140. DR 5-103(B); EC 5-7, -8. Some jurisdictions have not adopted the ABA position on
advancing living expenses. See Texas Code of Professional Responsibility, Tax. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 320a-1 app. (Vernon 1973).
141. Mahoning County Bar Ass'n v. Ruffalo, 176 Ohio St. 263, 199 N.E.2d 396 (1964). The
dissenting opinion noted the inequity of suspending Ruffalo from the practice of law.
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Samaritan and punishing him for acts of generosity, the Code reaches a
shocking result. Such a provision may enhance the income of attor-
neys, but it has no place in a body of rules for professional behavior.
Since advancing litigation-related expenses, which may involve
thousands of dollars for depositions and expert witnesses, is permitted,
it is ludicrous to suggest that advances for living expenses will compro-
mise attorney independence. The disparate effect of the present rule on
impecunious clients is an additional reason for its abolition.
D. Financial Arrangements. Attorney and Nonclients
1. Fee Splitting Between Attorneys
When an attorney forwards a case to another lawyer he may be
compensated only for work actually performed and for the responsibil-
ity undertaken. t42 This rule should be abolished because it does no
more than ban a market arrangement that, at least arguably, will serve
client interests better than the existing rule. This conclusion is based
largely on the experience in Texas, which appears to be the only state to
explicitly permit forwarding fees between attorneys.' 43
Forwarding fees are used most commonly in tort cases. These
cases are almost invariably handled on a contingent fee basis, and the
cost to the client is the same whether or not the case has been for-
warded. The common perception that clients will pay more for two
lawyers than for one is simply not true. Only relatively valuable cases
can be forwarded. Where fee splitting is banned, these cases are not
The railroad offers a meager totally inadequate settlement-a small percentage of what a
lawful judgment could reasonably be expected. In making this inadequate settlement
offer, the claims department of the railroad advises that the railroad can delay final deci-
sion for years. In short, the powerful can close the doors of the courts to the weak by
reason of the lack of finances of the claimant.
Under the pronouncement in the case at bar, lawyers in Ohio are not permitted to
give or loan financial assistance to a client even though the injured employee or the
dependents in case of death are in want and hungry.
Id. at 273, 199 N.E.2d at 403 (Herbert, J., dissenting).
142. DR 2-107; ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 34. The attorney must, of
course, obtain the consent of his client before forwarding a case. DR 2-107(l).
143. The relevant part of the Texas version of DR 2-107 reads:
(A) A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another lawyer who is not a
partner in or associate of his law firm or law office, unless:
(2) The division is made in proportion to the services performed and responsibil-
ity assumed by each, or is made with afowarding lawyer.
Texas Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-107, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-1 app.
(Vernon 1973) (emphasis added). The italicized language has been added in the Texas version of
DR 2-107. Otherwise the two provisions are identical.
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forwarded because few lawyers are so successful that they can afford to
give away cases that are likely to produce a substantial fee. Most law-
yers will not do so, no matter what is stated in the rules of professional
conduct, with the result that for the same fee clients will receive worse
rather than better lawyering.'"1
The fear that cases will be forwarded to lawyers who pay well
rather than to those who will best serve the client is unfounded. The
amount paid to the forwarding lawyer depends on the result achieved,
and therefore the best available receiving lawyer will be sought out.
The power to forward a case to a more qualified attorney also increases
the bargaining power of less qualified attorneys, and thus inexperi-
enced lawyers are able to obtain better settlements for their clients by
threatening to refer the case to a leading trial lawyer. When lawyers
are permitted to forward cases, grievance committees are better able to
sanction lawyers who do an inept job of handling complex cases. For
these reasons the Standards should permit fee splitting between
attorneys. 145
2. Payments to Nonlawyers
Payments to laymen for recommending a lawyer are prohibited by
the Code. 146 It is said that the public is best served if the recommenda-
tion of a lawyer is a disinterested one. 47 This rule is widely ignored,
and violators are rarely punished. Lawyers should be permitted to pay
laymen for steering clients to them if full disclosure is made to the cli-
ent, except when prohibited by law (for example, payments to law en-
forcement officials), by institutional rules (for example, payments to
hospital staff), or when solicitation rules have been violated. The issue
is whether such payments can be made the basis of disciplinary action
against a lawyer, not whether they are to be encouraged.
3. Contingent Fee Payments to Witnesses
The Code provides that payments to witnesses may not be made
144. The rule against forwarding fees is violated frequently throughout America. See Stokey,
Let's Re-Examine Fee Splitting, 61 A.B.A.J. 1253 (1975). The forwarding lawyer typically receives
one-third of the total fee. Upon occasion "responsibility assumed" is interpreted loosely as a
device to avoid the proscription on fee splitting between attorneys.
145. One commentator would require that the fee arrangement be in writing, signed by the
client and both lawyers, and subject to judicial scrutiny. See id. at 1254. See also G. HAZARD,
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contingent on the content of the testimony or outcome of the case.' 48
The justification for this rule is self-evident in view of the truth-seeking
purpose of trials.' 49 The constitutionality of this prohibition was re-
cently challenged by the plaintiff in a large antitrust case who argued
that he could not afford the expert testimony needed to properly prove
his claim unless he could utilize a contingent fee arrangement. 50 The
proscription on paying contingent fees to expert witnesses was held
constitutional because it did not affect a fundamental right or create a
suspect classification.' 5'
The drafters of the Standards should consider permitting such
payments. The testimony of an expert witness differs in a fundamental
way from that of other witnesses. Ordinary witnesses have knowledge
about actual events involved in a case. The expert witness normally
does not testify about the disputed facts in a case, but he presents spe-
cialized knowledge that may be useful in deciding a case. The primary
problem with expert witnesses is that they are paid for their testimony.
It is well known that certain experts appear repeatedly on behalf of
plaintiffs or defendants. The relevant question to ask is whether this
existing problem is exacerbated when the expert's payment is contin-
gent on the outcome of the case. The Code rule is grounded in the
concern that when the payment for testimony is dependent on the re-
sult of a case, the witness has an incentive to be less than truthful be-
cause a conflict between self-interest and truthfulness is involved. The
purchase of testimony involves the appearance of wrongdoing, as well
as an opportunity for actual impropriety. Perhaps professional pride,
disclosure of the fee, and concern about disclosure during cross-exami-
nation, will cause experts compensated on a contingent basis to be as
truthful as those compensated in other ways.' 2
The Code rule favors the wealthier party in complex cases and
defendant insurance companies in tort litigation. It is not self-evident,
148. DR 7-109(C). Payment of a reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert
witness is permitted.
149. The argument that contingent payments to expert witnesses should be allowed because
they are permitted for lawyers is a flawed one. The role of a lawyer is to be a partisan advocate,
but the role of a witness is to be a purveyor of truth. The conflict of interest is far more serious in
the latter situation.
150. Person v. Association of the Bar, 554 F.2d 534 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924 (1977).
151. Id. at 539.
152. It is standard practice to elicit from an expert witness on cross-examination that he is
being paid for his testimony. If contingent fees were permitted, their use would certainly be
brought to the attention of the trier of fact.
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however, that contingent fee payments to expert witnesses are evil. Un-
less it can be demonstrated that real harm is likely to occur from elimi-
nating the present Code rule, an intermediate approach should be
adopted that would allow the payment of a fee fixed in amount (either
a total or a fixed hourly rate) to be made contingent on the outcome of
a case, without allowing the actual amount of the fee to be contingent.
Thus, a fee of $500, or of $100 per hour, if plaintiff wins, would be
permitted, but a fee of two percent of the amount recovered by plaintiff
would not.
III. CONCLUSION
Law may be the last cottage industry. When the United States
declared its independence from Great Britain, Adam Smith had al-
ready observed a pin factory in which the task of making a pin was
divided into eighteen separate tasks, and ten people produced about
forty-eight thousand pins a day.'53 Automobile assembly lines long
ago demonstrated that complicated as well as simple tasks can be per-
formed more efficiently without loss of quality through the division of
labor. Some, perhaps many, legal tasks can be performed both well
and inexpensively through the use of paralegals, word processing
equipment, preprinted forms and similar techniques. Only in the last
few years, however, has serious consideration been given to practicing
law in an efficient manner; previously, the profession earned high prof-
its but served primarily the wealthy. The rules of proper professional
conduct by attorneys, as embodied in the Canons and Code, carefully
guarded against competition among lawyers and, along with state en-
forcement of unauthorized practice rules, tried to prevent encroach-
ment by nonlawyers. The posture of the Standards should be to avoid
restrictions on competitive activity among lawyers and the efficient de-
livery of quality legal assistance to the entire society.
It is appropriate to close with a word of caution. Many people
who have not done so previously are using the services of lawyers; these
lawyers will often be provided relatively inexpensively. Mass-pro-
duced products are less expensive but quality control problems occa-
sionally arise. Marginal producers of goods and services sometimes cut
comers, and uneducated consumers often are unhappy with their
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purchases. The response of the professional has to be better quality
control, not a limitation on competition.
